

Leadership: "To become an influential leader; to organize and control others; to achieve community or organizational goals."

Independence: "To have the opportunity for freedom of thought and action; to be one's own boss."

Self-realization: "To optimize personal development; to realize one's full creative and innovative potential."

(These three are associated with the masculine end of the scale.)

Service: "To contribute to the satisfaction of others; to be helpful to others who need it."

(This is associated with the feminine end of the scale.)

We find again, and on a very different sample, the assertive goals to be associated with masculinity, the service (nurturing) goal with femininity.

(3) *Large representative samples of the public in six European countries answering a poll on preferences for free versus nationalized enterprises* (McGee, 1977). A measure of the size of the enterprise in which people would prefer to work is strongly correlated with MAS ($\rho = .84$). This confirms that in lower MAS countries people think more frequently that "small is beautiful."

(4) *Large representative samples of the public in eight European countries answering a poll on attitudes toward retirement issues* (CCE, 1978). A general question about preferences for more salary or for shorter working hours shows answer percentages which correlate strongly with MAS ($\rho = .86$), in the sense that more masculine countries prefer more salary while more feminine ones strongly prefer shorter working hours. This reminds us of the "live to work" versus "work to live" dilemma discussed earlier.

Masculinity and the Content Analysis of Children's Books

McClelland (1961) derived national measurements of Need for Achievement (n_{Ach}) from a content analysis of children's readers. Across 22 countries, we found in Chapter 4, a strong negative correlation ($\rho = -.64$) between the countries' Uncertainty Avoidance Index and Need for Achievement as identified by McClelland in 1925 children's readers. However, there is a sizable second-order positive correlation with the Masculinity Index (multiple correlation coefficient with UAI + MAS: $R = .74$). The order of Need for Achievement as found by McClelland can be predicted to a large extent from UAI and MAS. High Need for Achievement according to McClelland's definition (as a national characteristic) stands for the combination of a willingness to take risks (low UAI) and of masculine assertiveness (high MAS).

This is a way of defining human accomplishment which is specific to a certain cultural and economic environment. In particular, to the economic environment of early capitalism. If we take "achievement" in a wider sense, in the spirit of the quote from Margaret Mead at the beginning of this chapter, it can apply to anything irreversible a human being can accomplish. In Chapter 4, Figure 4.3, I suggested that both high UAI and low UAI national cultures have their achievements, but while those in low UAI cultures tend to be defined in terms of (social) recognition, those in high UAI cultures tend to be measured in terms of the security they offer. In the same way, both high MAS and low MAS national cultures have their achievements, but these will be defined differently: In high MAS cultures, achievement is defined more

in terms of recognition and of wealth⁶; we can call this "ego accomplishment." In low MAS cultures it is defined more in terms of the quality of human contacts and of the living environment; this is "social accomplishment."

Denmark and Waters (1977) content-analyzed children's readers from different countries (France, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, and the USSR) for the sex roles of their main characters. Spain and France showed few females and pictured both males and females in sex-traditional roles only; Rumania and the USSR showed more females, but still fewer than males; some females were pictured in traditionally male roles. Sweden only showed more female than male leading characters and had some of both in nontraditional sex roles—for example, a boy as a babysitter.⁷ This fits well with the extreme position of Sweden on the feminine side of the MAS scale; but Spain and France also score on the "feminine" side of the midpoint. More data on other countries will be necessary to explore this further; intuitively, I would suggest that the role of women in society as reflected by the children's readers reflects the interaction of both masculinity and power distance.

A Summary of Connotations of the Masculinity Index Found in Survey and Related Material

In analogy with Figures 3.6, 4.2 and 5.4, Figure 6.3 integrates the connotations of low and high MAS scores found so far. Again, this presents a polarized picture; actual values often will be somewhere between the extremes described.

The number of different studies on which Figure 6.3 is based is smaller than in the case of the other dimensions (PDI, UAI, IDV). Besides the HERMES data we have two other narrow sample studies (Gordon and IRGOM), two studies of representative samples of entire populations (McGee and CCE), and one content analysis study (McClelland) which supply significant correlations with MAS. A more extensive literature search will probably lead to the discovery of other related studies. However, it is also likely that the masculinity-femininity dimension in national cultures is not as easily recognized by researchers as for example, the power distance or individualism dimensions. Researchers will therefore be less likely to ask the relevant questions. There is room for more cross-cultural studies in this area. As it is, the few studies that are available supply a picture supportive of the masculinity-femininity syndrome.

Masculinity and Some Anthropological and Psychological Concepts

The one concept from the anthropological literature which can be directly associated with masculinity is "*machismo*" (a need for ostentatious manliness), which is usually attributed to Latin American countries, especially Mexico. The Latin American female counterpart to *machismo* is "*Marianismo*"; a combination of near-saintliness, submissiveness, and frigidity (Stevens, 1973). In the HERMES data, some Latin American countries score far to the masculine side—Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia—which fits with the *machismo* image. Argentina and Brazil, however, score in the middle, while Peru and Chile score more feminine. Private discussions with Latin American spokesmen confirm that *machismo* is more present in the countries around the Caribbean than in the remainder of South America. However, it has

FIGURE 6.3 Summary of Connotations of Masculinity Index Differences Found in Survey and Related Research

See page	Low MAS Countries	High MAS Countries
188	• Relationship with manager, cooperation, friendly atmosphere, living in a desirable area, and employment security relatively more important to HERMES employees.	• Earnings, recognition, advancement, and challenge relatively more important to HERMES employees.
198	• Managers relatively less interested in leadership, independence, and self-realization.	• Managers have leadership, independence, and self-realization ideal.
195	• Belief in group decisions.	• Belief in the independent decision maker.
197	• Students less interested in recognition.	• Students aspire to recognition (admiration for the strong).
198	• Weaker achievement motivation.	• Stronger achievement motivation.
199	• Achievement defined in terms of human contacts and living environment.	• Achievement defined in terms of recognition and wealth.
196	• Work less central in people's lives.	• Greater work centrality.
198	• People prefer shorter working hours to more salary.	• People prefer more salary to shorter working hours.
195	• Company's interference in private life rejected.	• Company's interference in private life accepted.
195	• Greater social role attributed to other institutions than corporation.	• Greater social role attributed to corporation.
195	• HERMES employees like small companies.	• HERMES employees like large corporations.
198	• Entire population more attracted to smaller organizations.	• Entire population more attracted to larger organization.
195	• Lower job stress.	• Higher job stress.
195	• Less skepticism as to factors leading to getting ahead.	• Skepticism as to factors leading to getting ahead.
197	• Students more benevolent (sympathy for the weak).	• Students less benevolent.
198	• Managers have more a service ideal.	• Managers relatively less attracted by service role.
195	• "Theory X" strongly rejected.	• "Theory X" (employees dislike work) gets some support.
188	• In HERMES, more women in jobs with mixed sex composition.	• In HERMES, fewer women in jobs with mixed sex composition.

FIGURE 6.3 (Continued)

194	• Smaller or no value differences between men and women in the same jobs.	• Greater value differences between men and women in the same jobs.
199	• Sex role equality in children's books.	• More sex role differentiation in children's books.

also been signaled in, for example, British working-class youngsters (compare Figure 6.2).

There are case descriptions in the anthropological literature which fit the masculinity scores. For Iran (MAS = 43), Hall (1965: 50) writes:

In Iran . . . men are expected to show their emotions. Iranian men read poetry; they are sensitive and have well-developed intuition and in many cases are not expected to be too logical. They are often seen embracing and holding hands. Women, on the other hand, are considered to be coldly practical. They exhibit many of the characteristics we associate with men in the United States. A very perceptive Foreign Service Officer . . . once observed "If you will think of the emotional and intellectual sex roles as reversed from ours, you will do much better out here."

And this in a country where the *formal* role of women, under the influence of Islam, is one of submissiveness!

A fascinating development in cross-cultural psychology is the study of "psychological differentiation" across cultures, whose chief protagonists are H. A. Witkin and J. W. Berry. Witkin has worked in the United States in the area of test development for nearly four decades. He noticed a consistency in the differences in performance of individuals on a number of tests of perceptual ability, such as the Embedded Figures Test, Rod and Frame Test, and Body Adjustment Test (Cronbach, 1970: 240ff, 627ff). It became clear that these tests, next to pure ability, measure a personality component. Witkin introduced the distinction between "field-dependent" and "field-independent" persons. Field-dependent persons are influenced in their perception by characteristics of their physical and social environment. "Field-independent" persons are more "psychologically differentiated": In carrying out perceptual tasks, they are better able to keep an object and its environment apart. Field-dependent persons tend to rely on external frames of reference as guides to behavior; field-independent persons rely more on internal frames of reference (Witkin, 1977: 85). Field-dependent people generally can be shown to have better social skills; field-independent people have better analytical skills (Witkin and Goodenough, 1977: 682).

Psychological differentiation is related to sex.

Many studies in Western settings have shown that, starting around early adolescence, women tend to be more field-dependent than men. The difference between the sexes is slight, even though persistent: the range within each sex is vastly larger than the mean difference between the sexes [Witkin, 1977: 88].

Psychological differentiation is also related to age; data from both nonliterate and western settings seem to indicate a U-shaped relationship, with maximum field independence between 21 and 40 (Witkin and Berry, 1975: 37ff).

Berry (1976) has carried the study of psychological differentiation to the ecological level. Between 1964 and 1974, he tested more than 1000 members of 21 different communities in Africa, Australia, Europe, and North America with a battery of psychological differentiation tests. He found systematic differences in field-dependence levels which he related to factors in the ecological and cultural situations of these communities.

The research findings on psychological differentiation, though impressive, stop short of the comparison of modern societies. One exception is an unpublished Dutch master's thesis referred to by Van Leeuwen (1978: 110) which found sex differences on two tests of psychological differentiation to be insignificant for Dutch undergraduates; earlier studies on American undergraduates had shown significant sex differences.

Berry's discovery of significant differences in psychological differentiation among nonliterate societies makes it highly likely that there will be systematic differences among modern societies as well. In order to show these we should, obviously, have well-matched samples of the populations, as the range of variation within countries is likely to exceed the mean score differences among countries. I venture the hypothesis that such studies will show levels of field-independence in countries to be correlated with the countries' Masculinity Index, because:

- (1) As we saw above, in western settings women tend to be more field-dependent than men;
- (2) as we also saw above, people over 40 tend to be more field-dependent than younger people; in Chapter 8 I shall show that for the mainly male HERMES samples, work goals associated with the "masculine" cluster tend to decrease in importance and those associated with the "feminine" cluster tend to increase in importance with age;
- (3) also shown above, Dutch (low MAS) undergraduates showed smaller sex differences in psychological differentiation than U.S. (high MAS) undergraduates;
- (4) conceptually, valuing social relationships ("femininity") converges with relying on external frames of reference as guides to behavior ("field-dependence"); valuing ego-gratification ("masculinity") converges with relying more on internal frames of reference ("field independence"); and finally,
- (5) Kohn (1971), in a cross-national sample of over 3000 American men, found a significant positive correlation between field-independence and the size of the organization in which the men worked. We found an association of masculinity with a preference for larger organizations.

A feasible setting for such cross-cultural studies of psychological differentiation would be participants in international training courses or students of international schools.

THE MASCULINITY NORM, ITS ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES

Masculinity, Latitude, Population Growth, and Bigness

In analogy with the previous chapters, I have explored the relationship of the Masculinity Index (MAS) with seven economic, geographic, and demographic indi-

cators. The correlations are weaker than in the case of individualism. The highest (zero-order) correlation of MAS is with geographical latitude, in the sense that countries closer to the equator tend to be more masculine, countries closer to the poles more feminine ($r = -.31$); the relationship becomes stronger when we consider the poorer countries and the wealthier countries separately. We have to speculate on the explanation of the relationship between latitude and femininity. Latitude can only be an independent variable, so causality must run somehow from lower latitude to greater masculinity. We found earlier (Chapter 3) a negative relationship between latitude and power distance, which I interpreted as the result of a greater need for technology for survival in more moderate climates, which imposes a certain level of education and equality upon people. We can extend this argument to equality between the sexes. In more moderate climates, survival presupposes the mastery of complex skills by both men and women, which makes extreme inequality between the sexes unlikely.

A complex relationship shows up between MAS and population growth: It is negative for the wealthier countries and positive for the poorer ones. The overall picture is that the feminine end of the scale is associated with slower population growth in poorer countries and faster population growth in wealthier countries. Population growth depends strongly on the average family size (and, of course, on the level of medical care); thus, femininity means smaller families in poorer countries and larger families in wealthier countries. This is precisely what we would expect in those cultures in which the woman has a say in the number of children she bears; She will adapt the family size to the available wealth. Where male choice prevails in matters of family size, we find (too) large families in poor countries and small families in wealthy countries.

There are positive correlations between MAS and a country's population size, as well as with the size of the HERMES organization in the country. In both cases, bigness and masculine values go together. We saw earlier a relationship between femininity and the feeling that "small is beautiful"; the "small is beautiful" value is more likely in smaller countries and smaller organizations.

Masculinity and the Role of Women in Society

If the degree of masculinity or femininity of a country's dominant value system is related to sex role differentiation in HERMES (see earlier), it should be related in a more general way to the role of women in society.

We could try to determine the role of women in society from their participation in the paid work force. However, being allowed—or forced—to work for money is not necessarily a sign of greater independence: it may just be another form of slavery.⁸ Whether women do paid work does not determine the weight of their role, but what job they fill and how they are paid for it.

However, the Masculinity Index is negatively correlated ($r = -.64$) with the percentage of all working women who are in professional and technical jobs (at least across the wealthier countries, where there exist sufficient professional and technical jobs) (Boulding et al., 1976: Table 37). It is also correlated ($r = .56$) across the wealthier countries with an "index of segregation" for higher education: the degree to which it is customary that men and women choose *different* types of higher education (Boulding et al., 1976: Table 60). Thus, in more feminine countries more working

women are in the more qualified jobs, and in higher education the *same* courses tend to be taken by women and men.

There is also some evidence that in more masculine countries fewer men are positive toward the idea of seeing women in leading positions: This is based on a survey study in six countries by Bártová (1976). Aberbach and Putnam (1977) report on the percentage of women in parliament in six countries; while low all over, it still varies between four percent in Italy and Great Britain (high MAS) and 14 percent in the Netherlands (low MAS), with Germany, the United States, and France in between. Maurice et al. (1978: 5) compare wage differentials in France and Germany. While wage differentials between hierarchical levels are smaller in (lower PDI) Germany, wage differentials between men and women are smaller in (lower MAS) France.

Masculinity and Religion, Development Aid, and Traffic Habits

In Chapter 4 we found for countries with a Christian majority a correlation between uncertainty avoidance and the Catholic/Protestant ratio, indicating a tendency toward more Catholicism in more uncertainty-avoiding countries. However, the statistical analysis also shows a second-order positive correlation between the Catholic/Protestant ratio and the Masculinity Index. In fact, Christianity takes many cultural forms, both between and within countries and even within the larger churches. It is my personal feeling that the message of the Old Testament is more "masculine" (eye for eye, tooth for tooth) and the New Testament more "feminine" (turn the other cheek); thus, perhaps Christians have their choice in finding biblical support for more masculine or feminine norms. Catholicism has produced some very masculine tough currents (Templars, Jesuits) but also some feminine tender ones (Franciscans); and some Protestant groups defend strongly masculine values (Mormons, most fundamentalist sects). However, on the average, the data show that countries with a Catholic culture tend to be more masculine and those with a Protestant culture more feminine. A fact which supports this is that many Protestant churches now practice equality between men and women in their leadership and clergy, while the Catholic churches are led entirely by men.

A greater benevolence and need for helping the weak in more feminine countries, as found earlier in the chapter, could express itself for the wealthier countries in the percentage of the Gross National Product which governments spend on development assistance to third world countries. The statistical analysis shows that, indeed, across the 15 wealthy countries for which data have been published, the mean annual official development assistance (over 1967-1976) in percentage of 1970 GNP is strongly negatively correlated with the Masculinity Index ($\rho = -.81$). It is virtually uncorrelated with national wealth (GNP/capita) *per se*, so that it is evident that a value complex (femininity rather than masculinity) and not an economic condition (wealth) determines governments' willingness to give development assistance. The data also show no evidence that former colonial powers now give more (or less) development aid than countries which had no colonies.

We saw earlier (Chapter 4) that maximum allowed speeds on highways in Europe were related to uncertainty avoidance. They were not related to traffic death rates; the latter were negatively correlated with individualism (see Chapter 5). However,

the statistical analysis shows that there also exists a sizable (second-order) correlation between masculinity and *both* allowed speeds on highways *and* traffic death rates. In more masculine countries drivers are allowed to drive faster, *and* more people die in traffic accidents per 1000 vehicles. Both phenomena are consistent with a societal norm of greater assertiveness; in the more "feminine" countries there is not only more of a feeling that "small is beautiful," but also that "slow is beautiful." A lesser urge to show off in driving is certainly consistent with fewer traffic deaths.⁹

The Masculinity Norm and Its Origins

Figure 6.4 presents an integrated picture of the general societal norm behind the "low MAS" and "high MAS" syndromes, in analogy with Figures 3.7, 4.3, and 5.6. Figure 6.4 draws upon the summary of survey findings in Figure 6.3 and the correlations with country-level indices discussed afterward. As with the other three societal norms described in the previous chapter, the masculinity norm should be seen as a value system shared especially by the majority in the middle classes of a society.

Some suggested origins of Masculinity Index differences between countries are listed in Figure 6.5. The correlations of the Masculinity Index with the various ecological indicators are not very conclusive and explain at best only a small part of the variance in MAS. Much of societal masculinity-femininity differences must be historically and traditionally determined, in the same way as anthropologists report differences in sex role differentiation between otherwise quite similar tribes, which can only have historical/traditional origins. However, the mechanisms for the conser-

FIGURE 6.4 The Masculinity Societal Norm

Low MAS	High MAS
• People orientation. • Quality of life and environment are important. • Work to live. • Service ideal. • Interdependence ideal. • Intuition. • Sympathy for the unfortunate. • Levelling: don't try to be better than others. • Small and slow are beautiful. • Men need not be assertive but can also take caring roles. • Sex roles in society should be fluid. • Differences in sex roles should not mean differences in power. • Unisex and androgyny ideal.	• Money and things orientation. • Performance and growth are important. • Live to work. • Achievement ideal. • Independence ideal. • Decisiveness. • Sympathy for the successful achiever. • Excelling: try to be the best. • Big and fast are beautiful. • Men should behave assertively and women should care. • Sex roles in society should be clearly differentiated. • Men should dominate in all settings. • <i>Machismo</i> (ostentative manliness) ideal.

vation of such differences (Figure 1.4) are solid; as Chapter 8 will show, there is no sign of convergence in the direction of masculinity or femininity among modern nations. One possible explanation of the strongly feminine score of the Scandinavian countries is that this is inherited from the Viking society in which the women had to manage the villages when the men were away on their long trips. However, the next question becomes, Why did these men travel so far and so long — was it because they had women who were able to manage the home front? In this way the Viking phenomenon has to be traced to even earlier roots.

As argued in the beginning of this chapter, the crucial link in the transfer of sex role patterns must be the family, in which children model their sex role self-concepts after the values-in-use which they notice in the adults of both sexes with whom they are in contact. The sex role pattern is transferred together with other values. Power distance, for example, is also transferred in the family; I assume it to reflect the degree of absoluteness of the authority of adults, but mostly of the fathers, over the children. Masculinity or femininity is then related to the difference in roles between the parents or other male and female adults. For the transfer of power distance the role of the father is most crucial; for the transfer of masculinity the role of the mother is crucial.

Consequences of Different MAS Levels

The presumed consequences of differences in the norm for masculinity/femininity in societies are listed in Figure 6.6, they are partly based on the correlations found in this chapter and partly expanded on the basis of impressions and reasoning.

The different importance of achievement in more masculine versus more femi-

FIGURE 6.5 Origins of National Masculinity Index Differences

Low MAS	High MAS
• More necessary in colder climates in which more equal partnership of men and women improves chances of survival and population growth. • More necessary if country is very poor. More easily maintained if country is very wealthy. • Controlled family size: relatively small when country is poor, relatively large when country is wealthy. • Stronger position of the mother in the family. • Both father and mother used as models by boys and girls. • Same as high MAS.	• More easily maintained in warmer climates in which survival and population growth are less dependent on man's intervention with nature; women can be kept ignorant. • Less likely if country is very poor or very wealthy. • Uncontrolled family size: relatively large when country is poor, relatively small when country is wealthy. • Weaker position of the mother in the family. • Father used as model by boys; mother by girls. • Traditions going back several generations, reinforced or weakened by historical events.

FIGURE 6.6 Consequences of National Masculinity Index Differences

See pages	Low MAS Countries	High MAS Countries
	<i>Consequences for Society at Large</i>	
208	• Trying to be better than others is neither socially nor materially rewarded.	• There are rewards in the form of wealth or status for the successful achiever.
208	• Social adaptation-oriented school system.	• Performance-oriented school system.
204	• More benevolence versus the third world.	• Less benevolence versus the third world.
208	• Conservation of the environment is seen as a more important problem than economic growth.	• Economic growth is seen as a more important problem than conservation of the environment.
195 198	• Small-scale enterprises, projects, etc. popular.	• Large-scale enterprises, projects, etc. popular.
203	• Men and women follow the same types of higher education.	• Men and women follow different types of higher-level education.
183	• Men and women can both be breadwinners.	• Men are breadwinners, women are caketoppers.
183	• Less occupational segregation: e.g., male nurses.	• Some occupations are considered typically male, others female.
205	• Slower car driving, fewer accidents.	• Faster car driving, more accidents.
	<i>Consequences for Religious Life and Philosophical and Ideological Thinking</i>	
204	• In Christianity, greater affinity to Protestantism.	• In Christianity, greater affinity to Catholicism.
204	• Appeal of "tender" religious currents, philosophies, and ideologies.	• Appeal of "tough" religious currents, philosophies, and ideologies.
181 204	• Belief in equality of the sexes.	• Belief in inequality of the sexes.
209	• More moderate women's liberation movements.	• Aggressive women's liberation movements.
	<i>Consequences for Organizations</i>	
190	• Some young men and women want careers, others do not.	• Young men expect to make a career; those who don't see themselves as failures.
195	• Organizations should not interfere with people's private lives.	• Organizational interests are a legitimate reason for interfering with people's private lives.
203	• More women in more qualified and better-paid jobs.	• Fewer women in more qualified and better-paid jobs.

(continued)

FIGURE 6.6 (Continued)

194	• Women in more qualified jobs not particularly assertive.	• Women in more qualified jobs are very assertive.
195	• Lower job stress.	• Higher job stress.
209	• Less industrial conflict.	• More industrial conflict.
209	• Appeal of job restructuring permitting group integration.	• Appeal of job restructuring permitting individual achievement.

nine societies is definitely reinforced by a difference in rewards. A Norwegian colleague once explained to me that in his society "you shouldn't suppose you are better than anybody else," and a Spanish author writing about my own country, the Netherlands, wrote that "the Dutchman . . . is perpetually leveling everything and even one" (de Baena, 1968: 115). These are both very feminine-scoring countries; and in such countries, the social rewards for excellence are slight. The material rewards are reduced by equalitarian tax systems.

The differences in stress on achievement are also present in the school system. For example, school performance in Germany is an important issue; there is a strong pressure for performance, which in extreme cases can lead to suicide attempts among students who fail. In the Netherlands, for example, the amount of pressure for performance is much less; anything that looks like competitive pressure is socially disapproved of. Suicides among young people occur, but rarely because of failed exams.

One inferred consequence of differences in MAS which I mention in Figure 6.6 has to do with what both citizens and politicians in a country consider top priority issues. Two potential top priority issues are economic growth and conservation of the environment; and they are in conflict. Whoever watches the international political scene cannot avoid noticing that different countries use different priorities in the issue of economic growth versus environment. The point is that the essential choices are not rational. In a lucid analysis, Douglas (1970) shows that we are far from being the first civilization to realize that our environment is at risk, although the dangers differ. Every society has its ideas about things that pollute and argues about measures against it in terms of "time, money, God, and nature." The dangers of pollution today are certainly very real, but their evaluation is still not a rational process. In a discussion between Wildavsky (1976) and Crippock (1977), the former argues that the search for environmental quality contains many ritual, rather than rational, elements; and the latter answers that the non-rationality is as much on the side of the economists who oppose the environmentalists as of the environmentalists themselves. I suggest that the main non-rational value issue that opposes economists and environmentalists in this discussion is based on the masculinity-femininity dimension.¹⁰ We have seen evidence in this chapter that the feminine values syndrome puts greater weight on the environment ("living in a desirable area"), while the masculine values syndrome puts greater weight on earnings—and the various correlates found throughout this chapter confirm that this difference reflects something quite fundamental that stretches beyond the work situation. Applied to the growth-versus-envi-

ronment controversy, a more feminine value position will put higher priority on environmental conservation and a more masculine one on economic growth. Of course, events may shift the priorities too; but the value conflict will always be present. Currently, more feminine countries like Sweden and the Netherlands take a more "environmentalist" position; more masculine such as Germany and Belgium put more priority on economic growth. In Asia, masculine Japan has huge pollution problems with which it seems to be unable to cope, while China, in its development, attaches a greater priority to pollution control (Tsurumi, 1977). The masculinity scores of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan make it likely that the Chinese value system is considerably less masculine than the Japanese.

Among the consequences for ideological thinking I have put the suggestion that more masculine and more feminine countries have different types of women's liberation movements. Those in more masculine countries tend to be more aggressive; the ideal of women's liberation is that women can be as assertive as men: women try to beat men at their game. In more feminine countries, we find women's liberation movements which defend the reform of the entire society along traditionally "feminine" lines.

Most other entries in Figure 6.6 refer to aspects of the masculinity dimension discussed earlier in this chapter. However, two lines under "consequences for organizations" need more explanation. I suggest that a relationship can be expected between the strength of the masculinity norm and the tendency to resolve issues in industrial relations by open conflict. The masculinity-femininity dimension is the only one which sharply separates the Nordic from the Anglo countries; one of the most visible differences between, for example, Sweden and Great Britain is their different ways of handling industrial conflict issues, which in Sweden tend to be resolved by dialogue and in Britain by strikes (whether this really means a resolution is, of course, doubtful).

A final issue which I also associate with masculinity is the type of "humanization of work" or "job restructuring" popular in a country. In Chapter 5 I suggested that differences in individualism affect preferences for different forms of employee participation and worker self-management. Masculinity affects another trend in work organization reform: humanization of work. What is a "humanized" job depends on one's definition of what is human. In a masculine culture a humanized job should give opportunities for recognition, advancement, and challenge. In a feminine culture, the stress will more be on cooperation and the working atmosphere. This is illustrated by a most fascinating case study. In 1974, six U.S. automobile workers (two women and four men) worked three weeks in the Saab-Scania plant in Soedertaelje, Sweden, where a new "humanized" system of group assembly had been installed. Journalist Robert B. Goldmann (1975) went with them, and at the end of the third week he asked them whether they preferred the Detroit (U.S.) or the Soedertaelje (Swedish) system. *The only American who clearly preferred the Swedish system was a woman.* The other five chose the U.S. system, though two would accept the Swedish system under certain conditions. About the woman who chose the United States Goldmann writes:

Lynette Stewart chose Detroit. In the Cadillac plant where she works, she is on her own and can make her own challenge, while at Saab-Scania she has to consider people in front and behind her [1975: 48].

Goldmann also noticed that this very feature had been mentioned by a Swedish woman he interviewed as a point of attraction. This is clearly a value issue. Humanization of work, too, is a matter of values: of the "masculinity" or the "femininity" of one's point of departure.

NOTES

1. In the Roman Empire, the dominant philosophical trends considered males as superior (*sexus melior*), but, for example, the philosopher C. Musonius Rufus (first century A.D.) defended the equality of the sexes and, in particular, the study of philosophy by women and men alike (Eyben, 1976).
2. "Friendly atmosphere" also discriminates more between *occupations* than cooperation. On the other hand, the two formulations show hardly any difference in discrimination between *countries*, and "cooperation" discriminates better between age groups. The fact that different formulations of apparently almost the same concept discriminate differently among sexes, occupations, countries, and age groups is one of the reasons why ecological factors differ according to the criterion of aggregation used (for example, occupation or country).
3. The fact that I associate the "social-ego" factor with female-male preference (and not the "individual-collective" factor) seems to contradict the results of the variance analysis in Figure 2.3. In that case, I find a strong sex effect for earnings minus cooperation (= ego-social) but an even stronger sex effect for personal time minus training (= individual-collective). However, the variance analysis is based on different data: five other occupations (all from manufacturing plants) in only 10 countries; and only two of these occupations (clerks and unskilled workers) have sizable numbers of female incumbents.
4. The minimum limit of 20 female respondents per country is based on Hofstede (1975b) in which it is shown that work goal importance rank orders became less reliable for groups smaller than 20.
5. The ambition of women may be channeled toward *their husband's* career. In a study of the Dutch lower middle class, Berting (1968: 138-139) found that "in many cases, the wife is the motor behind the husband's aspirations for promotion."
6. In no country does wealth have so strong a symbolic value as in the United States. That country, of course, is a low UAI. High MAS country and McClelland's home culture.
7. Sweden has a deliberate educational policy for training both girls and boys in nontraditional sex roles. See Fredriksson (1969).
8. A crude labor force participation rate for women can be computed from the Yearbook of Labour Statistics (ILO, 1976: Table 1). Across 38 countries, this rank correlates -.01 with MAS. A similar rate is shown in Boulding et al. (1976: Table 1).
9. Galtung et al. (1976: 34) summarize a paper by Stang which describes the car as a "materialized ideology" representing, among other things, an "actionist" value orientation, "an ideal of extraverter efficiency, of conquering ever new challenges, new horizons." This is a masculine value orientation. The car has often been identified as a phallic symbol.
10. Gray (1973) links the impossibility in the United States to imagine a future without growth to the "masculine consciousness" in that country.

Chapter 7

INTEGRATING THE FOUR DIMENSIONS

SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER

The four dimensions of national culture described and analyzed in the Chapters 3 through 6 relate to basic problems of humanity. Some of the dimensions interact in their effects upon cultures. The combination of PDI and UAI affects in particular organization structures and functioning through the implicit models of the ideal organization which people carry. It also affects which theories of organization will gain popularity in a country.

The interaction of UAI and MAS is shown to relate to the dominant motivation pattern, thereby refuting the universality of the American motivation theories of McClelland and Maslow.

This chapter summarizes the significant correlations that were found between the HERMES indices and non-HERMES data: data from narrow surveys, from representative surveys, and from country-level indicators. For the seven geographical, economic, and demographic indicators used in each of the Chapters 3 through 6, the regression of each indicator on the four indices is shown.

The values of the four indices for the 40 countries can be used to form clusters of countries with similar index profiles. For a cluster analysis on the basis of the HERMES data, a hierarchical grouping method has been used which shows the overall closeness or distance of the country cultures in a "dendrogram."

A special analysis is done for two countries in which the HERMES surveys were taken in two languages each: Belgium and Switzerland. In Belgium, the two language areas are culturally very similar and belong to the same culture area; in Switzerland,

among countries which are evident in the data but are not explained by the present set of four indices. In that case, I would have done more justice to the variety of individual country cultures but at the same time would have lost part of the overall picture; I would have favored the trees at the expense of the forest.

Country Scores and Score Intercorrelations

The scores for the 40 countries on the four indices can be found in Figures 3.1, 4.1, 5.2, and 6.1. In Figure 7.1 the intercorrelations are shown among the four indices; across all 40 countries, across the 21 poorer ones (1970 GNP/capita below \$1300), and across the 19 wealthier ones. Across all countries, we find the $-.67$ correlation between the Power Distance Index and the Individualism Index, which explained why the two load on one factor (Chapter 5); a plot of PDI versus IDV which illustrates this negative correlation is shown in Figure 5.3. The correlation between PDI and IDV does not subsist for either the poorer or the wealthier countries separately.

Across all 40 countries, we also find weak correlations between PDI and UAI and between UAI and IDV.¹ Across the 21 poorer countries there are no significant correlations between the indices at all; they are mutually independent. Across the 19 wealthier countries, however, UAI is significantly correlated with PDI, IDV, and MAS, in spite of the fact that these three other indices do not show significant intercorrelations. Across the 19 wealthier countries, UAI functions as a kind of summary index; comparative studies which are limited to wealthy countries will easily distinguish only one dimension, Uncertainty Avoidance, which subsumes also Power Distance, Masculinity, and the inverse of Individualism.

In Chapters 3 through 6 I have considered one dimension at a time, thereby isolating each from the other dimensions (except in Chapter 5, where I considered PDI and IDV together in order to separate them). Isolating dimensions is a useful intellectual exercise in order to structure our observations; but in the reality of each country situation the four dimensions interact with each other. The effect of interaction of dimensions is particularly evident for PDI $\times$ UAI, and the next section of this chapter will be devoted to it. Later I shall also devote attention to the interaction of UAI $\times$ MAS.

FIGURE 7.1 Correlations Among the Four Indices Across All Countries, Poorer Countries Only, and Wealthier Countries Only

Pair of indices	Product moment correlations across		
	All 40 countries	21 poorer countries	19 wealthier countries
PDI $\times$ UAI	.28*	-.28	.52*
PDI $\times$ IDV	-.67***	-.30	.16
PDI $\times$ MAS	.10	.26	.16
UAI $\times$ IDV	-.35*	-.05	-.51*
UAI $\times$ MAS	.12	-.26	.43*
IDV $\times$ MAS	.00	.10	-.16

the two language areas show wide cultural differences and clearly belong to different culture areas.

The Four HERMES Dimensions Related to Universal Problems of Mankind

Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism and Masculinity satisfy Kluckhohn's criteria for "universal categories of culture" (see page 36); they form "a generalized framework that underlies the more apparent and striking facts of cultural reality." They come close to the "standard analytic issues" distilled from the literature on "National Character" by Inkeles and Levinson (1969: 447ff; see page 37).

- (1) Relation to authority: This obviously corresponds to the power distance dimension.
- (2) Conception of self: Under this heading, Inkeles and Levinson mention first "the individual's concepts of masculinity and femininity" (1969:450). This is the Masculinity dimension. Then they refer to the relationship between ego and society, quoting the work of E. H. Erikson on "ego identity" and by A. Kardiner on the "individual security system." This, obviously, is the Individualism dimension.
- (3) Primary dilemmas or conflicts, and ways of dealing with them: Under this heading, Inkeles and Levinson refer to the control of aggression, the expression versus inhibition of affect, and the dilemma of trust versus mistrust. These are issues that we found to be particularly associated with the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension.

In short, the four dimensions that were empirically found in the HERMES data are theoretically relevant. They describe basic problems of humanity with which every society has to cope; and the variation of country scores along these dimensions shows that different societies do cope with these problems in different ways. On each of these problems there is not just one possible answer; but a range of possible answers, even for modern industrial nations.

The four dimensions deal with issues that are equally relevant to psychologists (and psychoanalysts) and to sociologists. Some psychological connotations of Power Distance are dependency and the impact of the father on one's personality; of Uncertainty Avoidance, anxiety, aggression versus apathy, stress, and superego; of Individualism, ego identity; of Masculinity, assertiveness, sexual identity, and the impact of the mother on one's personality. Some sociological connotations of Power Distance are social stratification and inequality; of Uncertainty Avoidance, the need for structure and formalization; of Individualism, the relationship among individuals, institutions, and society; of Masculinity, social sex role differentiation.

The four dimensions, however, are not necessarily exhaustive; they do not represent the final word on dimensions of national culture. First, it may be that there exist other dimensions related to equally fundamental problems of mankind which were not found in the HERMES research because the relevant questions were simply not asked. Some suggestions for other dimensions can be found in a review of the literature in Hofstede (1980b: 42ff.). Second, these dimensions were based on one specific set of 40 modern nations, excluding, for example, all countries under state socialism and the smaller poor countries; adding these might change the range of values covered and affect the dimensions necessary to describe this range. Third, the four dimensions represent a compromise between comprehensiveness and attention to detail. I could have added more dimensions in order to account for differences

Power Distance Versus Uncertainty Avoidance

In Figure 7.2 I have plotted the position of the 40 countries on a PDI-versus-UAI axis. The axes and cluster lines in Figure 7.2 have been drawn arbitrarily in order to obtain maximum separation of geographically or historically distant groups of countries. We find a Latin plus Mediterranean cluster including *all* Latin countries in the high PDI, high UAI quadrant; in addition, this cluster includes Japan. All other Asian countries are found in two clusters with high PDI but medium to low UAI. On the low PDI side we find a mainly German-speaking cluster higher in UAI, which includes Israel and Finland; and two Anglo-Scandinavian clusters which include the Netherlands in the low PDI, low UAI quadrant.

In their impact on a society, power distance and uncertainty avoidance will interact. A high UAI score was related (Figure 4.3) to a strong superego. However, in a high PDI environment this superego will be personified in the form of a powerful person (the father, the leader, the boss). People will be able to blame the powerful people for their ills (a favorite pastime in the Latin countries) and will feel relatively free to sin if the boss isn't looking. In the higher UAI, low PDI countries this escape is




FIGURE 7.2 Positions of the 40 Countries on the Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance Scales

not available, and the superego is internalized. It is no accident that the concept of "superego" was invented by an Austrian, Sigmund Freud; we find Austria (and Israel) in the high UAI, low PDI corner. A reason for the very low PDI score in Austria (which means, among other things, that employees claim not to be afraid of disagreeing with superiors) may be that the idea of disagreeing with lawful superiors simply does not occur; it would make them feel guilty toward themselves.

In the low UAI countries there seems to be a greater freedom of experimentation with alternative behaviors (except that if PDI is high, it is the powerful person who decides what happens, but that person is not supposed to embody any rules or moral imperatives). There is a well-known joke that in Britain everything is permitted except that which is forbidden; in Germany everything is forbidden except that which is permitted; and in France everything is permitted, even that which is forbidden. The German word *verboten* has even found its way into the American language.

Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Organizations

In their impact on the structure and functioning of organizations, power distance and uncertainty avoidance interact as well. In cultures where PDI is high, power is the leading principle which keeps the organization together and which protects it against uncertainty. In cultures where PDI is low, there are two possibilities. If people have an inner need for living up to rules (high UAI), the leading principle which keeps the organization together can be formal rules. If people do not have an inner need for living up to rules (low UAI), the organization has to be kept together by more ad hoc negotiation, a situation which calls for a larger tolerance for uncertainty from everyone.

Earlier, I associated power distance and uncertainty avoidance with the two main dimensions of organization structure revealed by the Aston studies in Great Britain: power distance with "concentration of authority" and uncertainty avoidance with "structuring of activities." Pugh (1976: 70) uses a fourfold typology for describing organizations with high and low concentrations of authority and high and low structuring of activities. In Figure 7.3 I apply this typology to indicate the type of organization that fits best in a certain group of countries.

We should read Figure 7.3 in such a way that *ceteris paribus* (task, size of organization, etc., being equal) the countries in the fourth quadrant would tend more toward creating "implicitly structured" organizations, and, for example, those in the second quadrant more toward creating "full bureaucracies." In the full bureaucracy, the relationships both among people and between people and the work processes tend to be rigidly prescribed, either in formal rules and laws or in traditions. In the personnel bureaucracy, relationships among people are prescribed but not the work processes; in the workflow bureaucracy, the opposite is the case. Finally, in the implicitly structured organizations, neither the relationships among people nor those between people and the work processes are strictly prescribed.

In Figure 7.3 I also refer to "implicit models" of organizations in different countries which derive from unfortunately unpublished studies by Professor O. J. Stevens with French, German, and British management students at INSEAD, Fontainebleau. In one of a series of different experiments, he let students of the three nationalities individually analyze the same case study of an organizational conflict. The majority